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1 
Executive Summary 
Social engineering is the use of trickery, deception, persuasion, emotional manipulation, 
impersonation, and abuse of trust to gain information or access through the use of a human 
interface (Thompson, 2006). Social engineering relies on the human behavior in order to gain 
information or access. The technique of social engineering can be performed in numerous ways 
and has been proven to be an effective way for perpetrators to obtain valuable information.  
This capstone project, I will focus on social engineering of call centers and the steps 
organizations can take to reduce it. For most organizations, the call centers or customer support 
are there to provide assistance to others in a friendly and polite manner. They also have access to 
a great deal of information available to them which makes them an easy target for social 
engineers. Call centers are also the weakest link within an organization as they have few 
defenses in place.  Attackers are usually armed with information that they have obtained from 
other means about the person they are impersonating. With the growing number of security 
breaches involving personally identifiable information, attackers have more information 
available to use at their disposal. For these reasons, when attackers call in to these centers, they 
are usually able to answer the necessary authentication questions and are able to gain access to 
the desired information.   
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Social Engineering Defined 
Social engineering is the use of trickery, deception, persuasion, emotional manipulation, 
impersonation, and abuse of trust to gain information or access through the use of a human 
interface (Thompson, 2006). It relies on  expected human behavior in order to gain information 
or access. The technique of social engineering can be performed in numerous ways and has been 
proven to be an effective way for perpetrators to obtain valuable information. Social engineering 
poses information security risks as it bypasses most information security measures put into place 
including intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and access control systems (Bullée, Montoya, 
Pieters, Junger & Hartel, 2018). Social engineering relies on the weakest link in information 
security: humans. One of the biggest dangers of social engineering attacks is the fact that they 
can go unnoticed and appear to be legitimate on the surface. Social engineering can be 
devastating to its victims and can have long-term effects that are felt by its victims for years to 
come (Potter, 2018).  
Social engineers can use various techniques to gain the information or access they are 
seeking.  One technique that is used by social engineers is baiting. Baiting is a form of social 
engineering that relies on exploiting human curiosity. Social engineers make a promise of an 
item or goods to entice the victim. Baiting involves the use of physical media. For example, a 
social engineer will leave a USB drive with malicious software that the target will plug into their 
computer out of curiosity to see what is stored on it. This will then infect the user’s computer 
with the malicious software, giving the social engineer access to the victim’s computer 
(Whiteman, 2017). Steve Stasiukonis, Vice President and founder of Secure Network 
Technologies used a baiting attack to assess the security of his clients. Dozens of USB drives 
infected with a Trojan virus were distributed in the target organization’s parking lot. The infected 
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USBs activated a keylogger when the drives were plugged in to a computer. This allowed Steve 
and his team to gain access to a number of employees’ log in credentials (Bisson, 2015).  
Phishing is another form of social engineering that seeks to gather sensitive information 
from a victim to gain access to a system or network. Phishing is the most common form of social 
engineering (Whiteman, 2017).  It uses malicious websites or emails to pose as a legitimate 
person or organization in order to solicit  information. An example of phishing is an email that 
appears to be from a person’s bank telling them their account was blocked for suspicious logins. 
The email then directs the customer to a website to change their credentials, but first they have to 
enter their current credentials (Whiteman, 2017). Phishing emails often look like they are from a 
legitimate source, but some may be very poorly constructed making it obvious they are not 
legitimate. These emails make the victim feel a sense of urgency to act and victims often 
overlook the obvious errors that would tip them off that the email is not legitimate.  
Quid pro quo is another common form of social engineering that relies on reciprocity. In 
a quid pro quo attack, the attacker promises something in return if the victim complies with the 
attacker’s request. Most people are willing to give up sensitive information if they think they are 
getting something in return (Whiteman, 2017). An example of a common quid pro quo attack is 
an attacker posing as IT personnel, requesting access to their computer in order to fix an issue. 
Thinking that they are getting something in return, the victim allows the attacker access to their 
computer. In this example, the attacker then installs malicious software on the victim’s device 
and gains the information they are looking for (Whiteman, 2017). Colin Greenless, a consultant 
for Siemens Enterprise Communications, tested this approach with his clients to see how 
vulnerable they would be to this type of attack, Greenless posed as an IT engineer, made phone 
calls to the organization’s employees from his personal phone. Greenless advised the employees 
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that he noticed there was an issue with their emails and he needed their usernames and passwords 
to fix the issue. Greenless was able to obtain credentials from eighty-five percent of the 
employees he targeted (Wakefield, 2009). 
Pretexting is another form of social engineering in which the attackers fabricate a story or 
a pretext in order to gain access to someone’s personal information. Pretexting persuades the 
victim to give up some pieces of personal information and opens the door to allow the victim to 
gain trust in the attacker. Pretexting focuses on gaining both personal and nonpersonal 
information. This form of social engineering relies heavily on the ability of the attacker to gain 
the victim’s trust (Whiteman, 2017). By gaining the victim’s trust, the attacker is able to get the 
information they are after much easier. A key to gaining the victim’s trust in these types of 
attacks is to have a solid pretext, making sure that that there are not holes in one’s alias, story, or 
identity.  In the example above, Greenless’ pretext was that he was an IT engineer for the target 
company. By using this false identity, he was able to gain access to employees’ login credentials 
because the employees believed the story his was telling them (Wakefield, 2009).  
Another common form of social engineering is tailgating, also known as piggybacking. 
This is when an unauthorized person follows an authorized employee in to a restricted area in 
order to gain access to information, computers or networks. In order to go unnoticed by other 
employees the attack will have to make it appear as if they are supposed to be there. An example 
of this can be performed by the attacker pretending to make a delivery and asks an authorized 
employee to hold the door so that they could bring in the packages. The attacker is then able to 
bypass security measures that have been put in place (Whiteman, 2017).  In Greenless’ attempt 
to assess his client’s vulnerability, he also tested his tailgating abilities and was successful in 
gaining access to not only the building, but sensitive information. Greenless was able to access 
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the building because the swipe-card operated lift was held open for him,  he was not challenged 
by security and was able to walk right in. Greenless was able to access multiple floors in the 
building and actually set up in a meeting room where he worked from for three days. In his three 
days, Geenless was able to gain access to human resources information, information pertaining 
to mergers and acquisitions, and even the phone numbers of senior management. Greenless even 
brought in a second consultant who was able to gain access to the building as well (Wakefield, 
2009).  
How Social Engineers Work 
Social engineers rely on the different aspects of human nature and personality traits to 
trick others into giving them the information that they are requesting. Social engineers often find 
it easier to rely on the weaknesses in people to obtain the information they desire rather than 
trying to hack in to a system to obtain the information. It is much easier for a social engineer to 
manipulate a person rather than trying to bypass firewalls and intrusion detection systems 
(Peltier, 2006).  
Social engineers prey on  human nature in order to get what they want. Social engineers 
rely on peoples’ willingness to help. Companies train their employees that the customers’ needs 
are the most important thing and the goal is to have a satisfied customer. This often can lead to 
employees giving away too much information in an attempt to please the customer (Peltier, 
2006). Another aspect that the social engineer relies on is that human nature has a tendency to 
trust others until they have a reason not to. People are usually taken at face-value and believed to 
be who they say they are. Social engineers rely on this tendency to trust believing that they will 
seldom be asked proof of who they are. Another aspect that social engineers rely on is that 
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people act out of fear of getting in trouble. Employees may also take someone’s word at face-
value because they fear  repercussions if someone complains about them. Lastly, social engineers 
rely on the fact that people cut corners. Employees may not follow procedures for a number of 
reasons which can often lead to the social engineer obtaining the information they set out to 
obtain (Peltier, 2006).   
Another trait that social engineers rely on is the diffusion of responsibility. Social 
engineers will make the targets believe that they are not solely responsible for their actions by 
creating complex factors that will distract the target from their personal responsibility to make a 
decision (Peltier, 2006). Another trait that social engineers exploit is the chance for ingratiation. 
Targets are conned into believing that by complying with the social engineers they will be 
getting something in return. Social engineers also rely on guilt to get what they want. Social 
engineers will make the target believe that not doing what they ask will have significant 
consequences to the social engineer. Most people will comply with the request in order to avoid 
feeling guilty for not complying (Peltier, 2006).  For example, a social engineer may make a 
request for information from an employee. The social engineer can give a reason to the employee 
of why they need the information immediately, maybe they made a mistake and are facing losing 
their job if the employee does not help them. Many employees may not want the guilty feeling 
that the person making the request may lost their job and often complies with the request rather 
than dealing with what could be an uncomfortable situation (Peltier, 2006).   
Why Call Centers are Vulnerable  
The employees in an organization’s call center are most vulnerable to a social 
engineering attack because their job is to help the customer in a polite and friendly way. Call 
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center representatives are most focused on the satisfying the needs of the person who has called 
in. This, combined with the fact that call centers usually have access to the most customer 
information, make call centers the perfect target for social engineers looking to gain access to 
information (Aoki, 2018). Katherine Thompson, Founder and Chair of the Cyber Council at the 
Canadian Advanced Technology Alliance and Co-founder of the Security Culture Institute, 
stated “The fastest way to breach a company’s security is through customer service. The more 
companies want to please customers, the more that can be exploited by con artists, hackers and 
other cybercriminals through social engineering. (Aoki, 2018,)” Call centers are also a viable 
target for social engineers due to the amount of personal and financial information that is usually 
shared within a short phone conversation (Chang, 2017).  
Many companies have decided to outsource their call centers as they have expanded, and 
often rely on their call center agents to use scripts when assisting customers. While scripts can 
help call center agents to quickly respond to customer inquiries quickly, scripts also make it easy 
for a social engineer to be able to navigate their way through the answers to get to more 
information. Social engineers are able to call in repeatedly to learn the methods used by an 
organization and prepare themselves for future calls in to the call center. This also allows the 
social engineer to be able to gain a better understanding of a company’s internal structure. Social 
engineers may be able to gain information related to an organization’s network or key employees 
to target them in a future attack (Chang, 2007). A call center’s main focus is to process the calls 
and to process them concisely; the social engineer can rely on the fact that the agent on the other 
end of the phone wants to process the call as quickly as possible in order to keep their metrics up 
(Chang, 2007). Chris Roberts, chief security strategist at Acalvio a provider of advanced threat 
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detection and defense solutions, stated that the “confused” caller is often handled with little 
security due to the call center agent working through the calls so quickly (Chang, 2007). 
Another reason why call centers are a viable option for social engineers to obtain 
information can be attributed to the lack of vested interest in maintaining security from the 
employees. If the call center is not outsourced, the call center employees are often the lowest 
paid employees within an organization and have little interest in the company.  If the call center 
is outsourced, the employees working there are not even employees of the company.  Companies 
focus much of security efforts around cybersecurity, leaving the call center wide open for a 
social engineer to get through. Mark Lazar, CEO of call center security company Victrio, stated 
that “Fraudsters are shifting attacks into call centers. (McGarvey, 2013)”  Shirley Inscoe, a fraud 
expert with Aite Group, reported that there is a rise in call center attacks by organized criminal 
organizations (McGarvey, 2013.) Companies also do not provide the call center employees with 
ongoing training to being awareness to the problem (Chang, 2007). 
Call centers are also targeted due to their weak authentication processes. Call centers 
usually rely on a PIN to access an account. Based on a 2011 survey of United States consumers, 
Gartner Inc. believes that about 60 percent of consumers would use the same PIN to access an 
account through the phone as the one used for an ATM card. These PINs can be skimmed from 
an ATM attack and allow a fraud caller to gain access to an account. Another authentication 
method that is commonly used by a call center is caller ID. Organizations may rely on the phone 
number showing on the caller ID to identify a caller and authenticate the caller. Social engineers 
can circumvent this by manipulating the caller ID, hiding the true phone number that originated 
the call (Litan, 2014).   
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Many call centers rely on knowledge-based authentication procedures in order to allow a 
caller access to information. Knowledge-based authentication is the process of asking a caller 
questions that only the true customer should know in order to identify if the correct person is on 
the other end of the phone.  Knowledge-based authentication can be questions that the customer 
set up themselves, or can be based on the customer’s life history, found in public records 
databases (Litan, 2014). Examples of knowledge-based authentication questions can be: What is 
the name of the customer’s high school? What is the customer’s previous address? What is the 
make or model of the customer’s current vehicle? With the rising trend of data breaches 
involving personally identifiable information and the use of social media, social engineers are 
able to obtain this information needed to be able to successfully authenticate with knowledge-
based questions. According to the Identity Theft Resource Center, from January 1, 2005 to 
September 30, 2018 there were 9,463 breaches reported with over 1.1 Billion records exposed. 
These breaches are defined as incidents in which an individual’s name in combination with a 
Social Security number, driver’s license number, medical or financial records are potentially at 
risk of being exposed as a result of the breach (Data Breaches, n.d). The Identity Theft Resource 
Center also noted that in 2017, the number of incidents reported reached a record high of 1,579 
incidents. This was a 44.7 percent increase over the reported incidents from 2016 (2017 Data 
Breaches, 2018).  
Call Center Fraud Cost is on the Rise 
Call center fraud is growing at alarming rates and the cost to companies is growing. 
Pindrop Labs analyzed over 10 million  calls to a major organization’s call centers between 2011 
and 2016. Pindrop found that in 2013 the average call center had 1 fraud call for every 2,900 
calls that it received. By 2017, the rate of fraud calls received increased 45 percent to 1 in every 
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2,000 calls. The rate is even higher for financial institutions, with 1 in every 1,700 calls being 
fraudulent and can be even higher for credit card companies (Dewey, 2017).  Pindrop has 
attributed the growth of call center fraud to the rollout of EMV chip credit card technology in the 
United States, increases in data breaches worldwide, and advancements in online and mobile 
security. The financial costs of call center fraud also increased from $.57 per call in 2013 to $.65 
per call in 2015. The increased losses are contributed to attackers being more sophisticated with 
even more information at their disposal then they have had in the past. It is estimated that call 
centers who are receiving about 40 million calls per year are losing 25 million dollars annually to 
call center fraud (Dewey, 2017).  
In addition to the obvious costs of call center fraud, there are hidden costs to 
organizations that are not as obvious. Call centers will need to establish the caller’s identity prior 
to offering assistance which can be more time consuming. This can create a negative customer 
experience and cause customers to become easily frustrated with the call center employees. 
When call center agents cannot quickly discern the legitimacy of the caller, agents typically 
spend much more time trying to authenticate the caller which can ultimately make a legitimate 
customer feel like they are being treated like a criminal (Dewey, 2017). Longer call times 
associated with establishing the caller’s identity also contributes to higher operational costs for 
the call center. Attacks on call centers can also lead to data breaches and compromising 
customers’ personal information. These types of attacks can severely damage an organization’s 
reputation. The Aite Group surveyed twenty-five executives at eighteen of the forty largest U.S. 
based financial institutions from August 2015 to February 2016. The survey asked the executives 
to rate the social engineering fraud trend their organizations were seeing in their contact centers. 
Twenty-eight percent surveyed reported a minor issue, half reported it was a major issue and 
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twenty-two percent reported it to be a critical issue in their institution. Of the executives 
surveyed, only one reported that contact center fraud losses have trended downward due to 
process overhauls related to authentication, fraud prevention, policy changes and training. 
Seventeen percent of the respondents claimed that the trend was flat but admitted that they have 
a lack of insight to contact center fraud as they do not perform root cause analysis (Inscoe, 
2016). Seventy-two percent of the executives surveyed also reported that they forecasted that the 
fraud trends in the contact center would increase over the next one to two years.  
Tools Used in Call Center Social Engineering 
 Burner phones are widely used  when perpetrating social engineering through phone 
calls. Burner phones are convenient for the social engineers to use because they are generally 
untraceable, purchased normally with cash or a gift card and discarded after use. There are also 
applications available that serve the same purpose as a burner phone as well. While the 
applications that provide burner phone service are used because a social engineer can quickly get 
access to a new number, they are not as secure as having the actual phone (The Social 
Engineering Framework, n.d.). Burner phones allow the social engineer to perpetrate the fraud 
with virtually no way of tracing the calls back to them.  
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is another tool that social engineers have to use to 
perpetrate fraud. VoIP uses broadband internet to make voice calls rather than a traditional 
landline or cell phone (Voice Over Internet Protocol, 2015). VoIP calls are also widely used in 
call center fraud and social engineering. Pindrop Labs identified that 7.8 percent of the general 
public uses VoIP as there means for phone communication. Bad actors used VoIP for 53 percent 
of their calls (Urrico, 2015). VoIP is frequently used by social engineers because VoIP is 
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inexpensive and allows users from all over the world to call wherever they would like while 
concealing their true identity.  
Social engineers have also made use of the caller ID that so many people and 
organizations rely on to identify who is calling. Social engineers make it appear as if they are 
calling from a specific phone number by using caller ID spoofing. By spoofing a caller ID 
display, the social engineer can make it appear as if the call is coming from within the 
organization, from a partner organization, or even from the customer. Spoofing the caller ID to 
show that the call is coming from who they are impersonating can often falsely add to the social 
engineer’s credibility. One popular way to spoof the caller ID is with the use of Spoofcard. 
Spoofcard allows someone to purchase a card, call a 1-800 number and provide the PIN number 
associated with the purchased card. The purchaser then enters the phone number they want 
displayed followed by the phone number they want to call. Spoofcard does come with a cost but 
is easy to use and works just as described (The Social Engineering Framework, n.d.). Spoofcard 
also allows users to record conversations. Spoofcard also allows the caller to change their voice 
to sound like a woman or a male, as well as adding in background noises that the user wishes. 
Another spoofing tool is SpoofApp, which works relatively the same as Spoofcard. SpoofApp 
allows users to download an application on their cell phone to allow the same features through an 
application on a cell phone as the Spoofcard. Caller ID spoofing can also be done with VoIP 
calls using services from companies such as Asterisk. Companies like Spoofcard and Asterisk 
promote that their intended services are to protect the identity of legitimate users, but social 
engineers have found that these services offer them a great tool to be able to perpetrate fraud 
(The Social Engineering Framework, n.d.) 
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How to Prevent or Mitigate Fraud 
 In order to prevent or mitigate social engineering attacks on call centers, an organization 
needs to ensure that they have proper internal controls in place. Having strong policies and 
procedures in place will help a call center representative when being challenged with a social 
engineering call. Ensuring that there are strong authentication procedures in place to being able 
to identify the caller on the other end of the phone is essential in fighting social engineering 
through the call center. Another way to prevent or deter fraud in a call center is to provide 
ongoing training to call center agents (Aoki, 2018). Agents need to be aware of social 
engineering, have an understanding of what it is and how to identify when it is happening. 
Agents also need to be trained on how to escalate when they think there is an issue. Call center 
agents need to be empowered to safeguard customer information and know that the customer’s 
privacy comes first (Aoki, 2018). Agents should also be trained to trust their gut, instead of just 
going through the motions. Proper training of call center staff will allow an organization to 
balance security and customer service so that important information is protected without 
jeopardizing customer experience (Aoki, 2018). Agents should also be trained on the red-flags to 
look for when it comes to social engineering. For example, were there multiple calls from the 
customer in a short time period? Is this typical activity for a customer? Were there a number of 
profile changes before the current call? By training agents on what to look for, organizations can 
combat fraud at the front door. Call center agents need to be made aware of the risk of social 
engineering, how to identify it and what to do when it is identified. If an organization fails to do 
this, there is little organizations can do to prevent the dangers to the may follow (Potter, 2018). 
Training employees is a vital part of preventing social engineering in the call center, but 
it is recommended that organizations also implement strong authentication tools that will assist 
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agents in identifying a fraudulent caller. There are a number of authentication methods that 
organizations can implement from technology-based to knowledge-based methods. By 
implementing these authentication methods, organizations can take the decision making out of 
the call center agents’ hands, relying on the tools to decide if the caller is legitimate. Each 
method has its own benefits and drawbacks. In Lexis Nexis’ report Confronting Fraud at the 
Call Center, the risk solution company recommends a multi-layered authentication approach to 
preventing call center fraud rather than using just one method. The use of knowledge-based 
authentication integrated with phone or voice analytics or one-time passcodes is the best way to 
ensure secure authentication while not impacting customer experience (Confronting Fraud at the 
Call Center, 2016).  
Authentication Tools Available 
While knowledge-based authentication is not an ideal method to authenticate callers, it is 
something that is still frequently used as some still believe it to be effective. Changes to current 
knowledge-based authenticators could make this method more secure and more effective. Instead 
of relying on questions found in public records, social media, or even compromised through data 
breaches, companies should start to look for information that only the company and the customer 
should know. Avivah Litan stated “knowledge-based authenticators based on internal records 
that the criminals haven’t stolen yet is a good option (Crosman, 2016).”  Using knowledge-based 
authenticators based on internal records could slow the criminals down and make it harder to 
gain access.  
The issue that still surrounds knowledge-based authentication is that a skilled social 
engineer may still be able to get this information from a call center representative. If a social 
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engineer calls in to a call center and is unable to answer the questions being asked, organizations 
run the risk that the caller will hang up and call back repeatedly until they are able to get 
someone on the phone who is willing allow them access (Crosman, 2016). Another issue with 
knowledge-based authentication is that it is estimated between 10 and 20 percent of callers are 
unable to answer authentication questions are legitimate callers. It seems as though the fraud 
caller can answer authentication questions quicker than some legitimate callers (Litan, 2014). 
Litan believes that knowledge-based authentication is practical when it is deployed in the right 
way, but it does not offer 100 percent prevention (Crosman, 2016).  
One-time passcodes (OTP) are also used by call centers to authenticate the caller on the 
other end. OTP are just that, a single-use code that is sent to a customer in an attempt to 
authenticate a customer. OTP can be sent by SMS to a mobile phone, phone or email. Due to the 
fact that OTP is a single-use method, this eliminates the risk associated with shoulder-surfing or 
overhearing the code to gain access at the later time (Potter, 2018). The method of OTP has been 
used for over ten years and is convenient for users as the majority of people have access to a 
smartphone. According to a study conducted by Pew Research Center, only 5 percent of 
Americans reported that they did not have a mobile phone and 77 percent of Americans had a 
smart phone (Potter, 2018).  
This method was once cutting-edge but has since been diminished over the years. The use 
of OTP requires an organization to have the correct information on file for the customer they are 
attempting to authenticate (Brand, 2015). Another disadvantage of OTP is that it is sent to a 
phone number and relies on the security of the mobile carrier. A mobile phone account takeover 
(ATO) will result in OTP as an authentication unreliable. In a mobile phone ATO, SIM cards can 
be swapped, and phone numbers can be ported. This would result in the OTP being sent to a bad 
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actor instead of the legitimate customer (Potter, 2018). Mobile devices are also susceptible to 
malware and viruses, which means that the OTP can be intercepted by someone other than the 
customer (Potter, 2018). Another disadvantage to OTP is that applications allow users the ability 
to synchronize applications across multiple platforms and devices. This means that if a one of the 
user’s devices is compromised, the fraudster can intercept the OTP through an application on 
another device (Potter, 2018).  
Voice biometrics, also known as a voice printing, is another way to prevent social 
engineers from manipulating their way through a phone call. Biometrics is derived from the 
Greek words bio and metric; bio meaning life and metric meaning to measure (Voice Biometrics, 
2017). Voice biometrics uses physiological and behavioral features in a person’s voice that can 
be used to identify and verify the caller. Voice biometric technology allows an organization to 
create a voiceprint of their customer who is calling in. When a customer calls in later, a quick 
search of the voiceprint database allows the caller to be identified and thus authenticated (Voice 
Biometrics, 2017).  Voiceprinting can eliminate the need for the caller to answer security 
questions or provide personal information.    
In addition to authenticating a legitimate caller, voiceprinting can also help to catch the 
fraud caller who is calling in. Voiceprints can be blacklisted when a fraud caller has been 
identified. It is estimated that about 70 percent of call center fraud is being done by the same bad 
actors, so being able to blacklist a voiceprint will help an organization to identify when a known 
bad actor is calling back in (Litan, 2014). This database of blacklisted voiceprints will take away 
the need for call center representatives to have to make a difficult decision of whether or not to 
proceed with assisting a suspicious caller on the end of the line (McGarvey, 2013). One 
challenge with blacklisting a voiceprint is that fraud callers can distort their voice and use voice 
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synthesizers (Litan, 2014.) The voice biometrics industry is expected to grow to $4.7 billion by 
2020. In 2015, the banking industry spent over $750 on voice biometrics as many financial 
institutions believe that this best way to secure customer information (Voice Biometrics, 2017). 
Voice biometrics not only can enhance security, but also allows the call to be quicker as it 
eliminates the need to authenticate a caller. Voice biometrics is expected to be adopted by more 
industries, including mobile carriers, airlines and credit card companies. Visa is also planning to 
adopt the technology by requiring customer’s making online purchases to speak into a 
microphone during the transaction to authenticate (Voice Biometrics, 2017).  
Barclays implemented voiceprint in 2012 and 57,000 of their customers are enrolled in 
the service. On average, sixty-five percent of their calls are authenticated using voiceprint. 
Barclays is reporting that voiceprint has made their authentication more secure for the customers 
and has reduced fraud through the phone channel. One limitation in the research is the amount of 
savings to Barclays due to the implementation of voiceprint. Barclays is also reporting other 
added benefits in addition to the fraud savings. Since the implementation of voiceprint, Barclays’ 
call center has reduced call times by fifteen percent and they have a ninety percent reduction in 
complaints regarding their security (Customer Service Solutions, 2014).  
Banco Santander also implemented voiceprint technology in their organization and is 
seeing many benefits from using the service. Banco Santander chose voiceprint technology 
because it was reasonably priced,  was also convenient for their customers and provided a high 
level of security.  Banco Santander was the first bank in Mexico to rollout voiceprint technology. 
By September 2014, the bank had over 2.1 million customers enrolled in voiceprint and used the 
voiceprint authentication in over 4.1 million calls. While there is no information on the savings 
of the use of voiceprint related identifying fraud, Banco Santander has reported a savings in 
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operational costs. Banco Santander saw a savings of one million dollars the first year after 
implementing this technology and were anticipating that their investment in voiceprint 
technology would be paid back by the savings within three years. Banco Santander’s call 
handling times dropped because the time spent on authenticating customer was reduced from 72 
seconds to 30 seconds. Banco Santander was able to shift the focus of 53 agents to allow them to 
work on other tasks. Banco Santander’s survey of its customers also shows that customers are 
more satisfied with the ease of use of voiceprint and the ability to conduct transactions quicker 
and more efficiently (Nuance Communications Inc., 2014).  
While voice biometrics seems like a promising way to fight fraud through a call center, 
there are some issues with voice biometrics that could complicate a call. For instance, if a caller 
is sick or there is bad connection with the call voice biometrics may be unreliable. Background 
noise during a call may also cause voice biometrics to be unreliable. It is estimated that between 
the corporate and government use of voice biometrics, there are over 90 million voice prints 
stored in databases (Satter, 2014). 
The American Civil Liberties Union believes that the use of voiceprints raises privacy 
issues. Jay Stanley, an analyst for the ACLU, stated that “reducing fraud is a good thing, but we 
can’t anticipate what bright new uses this database will be put to in the future,” referring to the 
blacklists of voice prints (Satter, 2014). Another issue arising from the use of voice biometrics is 
consent. Bank who are using this technology are assuming consent, at best, by playing a message 
that the call may be monitored or recorded. Companies could possibly run into legal issues as 
some states restrict collecting and sharing of biometric data (Satter, 2014). While an argument 
can be made that the collection of biometric data is to protect customers. Stanley argues that the 
original intent nobody objects to often broadens and leads to different uses of collected 
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information (Satter, 2014). For example, a caller may anonymously call in to a radio station to 
give their opinion on a topic without being identified. Someone in possession a voiceprint 
database may run the voice through the database and be able to find the true identity of the 
person on the radio (Stanley, 2015). Stanley also argued that the voiceprint technology does not 
report the false-positive or false-negative rates, making it possible that a legitimate caller may be 
treated unfairly if they falsely match to the voice of a fraud caller (Stanley, 2015). Another issue 
that Stanley brings up is that the danger of spoofing voiceprints is unknown. As with most 
technology, fraudsters find ways around it. It is still unclear if or how easily fraudsters can find a 
way to get around voiceprinting to gain access to the information or accounts that they are 
targeting (Stanley, 2015).  
Another possible method to identify call center fraud is the use of phone printing. Phone 
printing analyzes multiple factors from the phone call to detect and identify a fraudulent call.  
Phone printing creates a unique telephony profile by analyzing audio features. Some of the 
features that are analyzed include the spectrum of the call including the quantization, and 
frequency filters; packet loss and noise clarity. Phone printing analyzes the caller’s metadata and 
compares it to the caller’s geo-location to determine if there is discrepancy between the two, 
indicating a suspicious caller (Phoneprinting Technology, n.d.). Like voice printing, fraudulent 
phone prints can be blacklisted so that if a bad actor uses the same phone print in the future, call 
center agents will be able to identify the fraud caller quickly to mitigate any fraud attempts 
(Litan, 2014). Phone printing can also identify anomalies in calls, track calls, and detect the 
origination of the call. Phone printing can tell if the call is a coming from a landline, mobile 
phone or voice over IP phone. Phone printing can also detect if the phone number on the caller 
ID is being spoofed (Litan, 2014). Phone printing has proven to be an effective method in 
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fighting social engineering of call centers. Payment Systems for Credit Unions, Inc. (PSCU) 
became the first credit union service provider to adopt phone printing technology through 
Pindrop Security in their call centers in the fourth quarter of 2014 (PSCU, pindrop partnership, 
2018). Phone printing technology allowed PSCU to identify and confirm over 300 fraudulent 
calls within the first month of implementation, leading to an estimated savings of $1 million in 
the first month.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, social engineering in call centers is a growing problem that organizations 
are facing and are expected to continue facing. While organizations are focusing on their fraud 
prevention efforts on cybersecurity, they are failing to protect their weakest leak-the call center. 
Social engineers are relying on manipulating people as it is easier to bypass than other security 
measures in place like firewalls and intrusion detection systems. Social engineers rely on 
expected human behavior in order to gain access to the information they seek. Social engineers 
rely on people’s willingness to help and play on their targets’ emotions in order to manipulate the 
person in to doing what they want.   
 An organization’s call center usually has access to a great deal of information. This 
combined with their willingness to help and weak authentication methods make them popular 
targets for social engineers. Organizations need to put some focus back on their call center by 
giving their employees the training and tools they need to survive these type of attacks. By 
training call center employees the red flags to look for when it comes to social engineering, call 
center agents will be able to identify these attacks and take control of the situation. Organizations 
should also invest in better authentication methods in order to give their call center employees 
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the necessary tools to combat social engineers. Using knowledge-based authentication based on 
the organizations internal records allows call center agents to ask questions that only the 
organization and their customer should know the answer to. This method is more secure than 
traditional knowledge-based authentication that is traditionally based on the customer’s life 
history and public records. With the increase of data breaches on PII and the use of social media, 
the questions used in traditional knowledge-based authentication can be easily found by the 
social engineers.  
 In addition to strengthening knowledge-based authentication, it is recommended that 
organizations invest in technology-based authentication methods. Technology-based 
authentication methods include OTP, phone printing, and voiceprint. OTP has been around for at 
least ten years and allows customers to receive a single-use code by email, phone, or SMS to 
verify their identity. Phone printing created a telephony profile by analyzing the voice audio. It 
analyzes the spectrum and frequency filters as well as the metadata to determine the true 
origination of the call. Voice printing analyzes physiological and behavioral features of the 
caller’s voice to identify and authenticate the caller. Voice printing also allows for voices to be 
blacklisted to easily identify when a fraudulent caller is calling in. Voice printing not only adds 
to an organization’s security but has also cut the operational costs of those who have 
implemented the technology. The voice biometrics industry is expected to continue to grow and 
be adapted by more industries over the next few years.  
 Organizations continue to implement the authentication methods above in an attempt to 
prevent fraud in their call centers. PSCU did report that within the first month of implementing 
phone printing they were able to identify over 300 fraudulent calls with an estimated savings of 
$1 million. There is not much information available about the organizations that have 
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implemented the recommended authentication methods and how the methods have reduced their 
fraud. This could be due to the fact that they do not want to tip off the fraudsters by sharing what 
fraud prevention methods they have in place. While most organizations are not reporting their 
fraud reduction, Banco Santander and Barlcays have both reported benefits not related to fraud 
reduction. After the implementation voice biometrics both organizations have increased their 
customer satisfaction and reduced their operational costs. It is clear that there are benefits to the 
organizations that implement these authentication methods. Organizations that are implementing 
these authentication methods will be in a better position to prevent social engineering in their call 
centers than those organizations who are not focusing on their call centers.  
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